what did the greeks use to win the battle of salamis
The Battle of Salamis was a naval battle between Greek and Farsi forces in the Saronic Gulf, Hellenic republic in September 480 BCE. The Greeks had recently lost the Boxing of Thermopylae and drawn the naval Battle at Artemision, both in August 480 BCE, as King Xerxes I (r. 486-465 BCE) and his Persian army went on the rampage. The Greeks won at Salamis, ane of the greatest and most significant military victories in antiquity. Overcoming superior numbers with daring tactics and sheer determination, the allied Greek forces won a freedom which would allow a never-before-seen period of artistic and cultural endeavour which would course the foundations of Western culture for millennia.
Context: The Western farsi Wars
Some 30 Greek poleis were preparing to fight back & the Battle of Salamis would show Xerxes that Greece was far from being conquered.
By the outset years of the 5th century BCE, the Farsi Achaemenid Empire, nether the dominion of Darius I (r. 522-486 BCE), was already expanding into mainland Europe and had subjugated Thrace and Republic of macedonia. The next objective was to quell once and for all the drove of potentially troublesome rebel states on the western border of the empire. In 490 BCE Greek forces led by Athens met the Persians at the Battle of Marathon and defeated the invaders. The battle would take on mythical status among the Greeks, only in reality it was merely the opening overture of a long war with several other battles making upwards the main acts. In 486 BCE Xerxes became king, and he invaded first the Cyclades and then the Greek mainland after victory at Thermopylae in Baronial 480 BCE against a token Greek forcefulness. At the indecisive naval battle of Artemision (too in August 480 BCE), the Greeks held off the superior numbers of the Western farsi fleet but were obliged to regroup at Salamis.
Greece and then, lay open to the invaders and Persian forces rampaged through the Greek poleis or city-states, sacking even Athens itself. Some 30 Greek poleis, even so, were preparing to fight back and the Battle of Salamis would show Xerxes that Greece, or at least a large chunk of it, was far from being conquered.
The Persian Armada
The vast Persian Empire stretched from the Danube to Egypt and from Ionia to Bactria, and Xerxes was able to draw on a huge reserve of resources to amass a huge invasion force. Ariabignes, the son of Darius, commanded the Ionian, Carian, Achaimene, and Egyptian fleets. Cybernis, the king of Xanthos, led the Lycian armada of 50 ships. Artemisia, the tyrant of Halicarnassus, led the Dorian fleet of xxx ships and other known commanders included Prexaspes, Megabazus, and Achaimenes. Technically, the Persians, and specially the Phoenicians, were better seamen, but as the fleet was drawn from all parts of the Empire, the motivation and advice levels were perhaps less than their opponents who all spoke the same linguistic communication and who were fighting not merely for their own survival merely that of their families and their way of life.
Ancient Naval Battle
The exact number of ships in the Persian fleet is not known. Herodotus in his Histories (440-430 BCE) compiles precise lists but these are widely thought to be exaggerated and unreliable. Also, his list is for the Persian fleet which originally sailed to Greek waters and by the time of Salamis, many would have been left to guard ports and supply routes or have been lost in storms (peculiarly at Magnesia) and in the Battle of Artemision a month before. Nevertheless, below are his figures for triremes - warships with 3 banks of oars (notation the contributions from conquered or pro-Farsi Greek cities):
- Phoenician 300
- Egyptian 200
- Cyprian 150
- Cilician 100
- Ionian 100
- Hellespontine 100
- Carian lxx
- Aolian 60
- Lycian l
- Pamphylian thirty
- Dorian 30
- Cyclades 17
An culling source - the writer of Greek tragedy Aeschylus - does seem to back up Herodotus in his Persae (472 BCE) where he states that the Persian fleet had 1,207 ships compared to the Greek force of only 310. Accounting for losses incurred in the manner described above it is estimated that perhaps around 500 triremes faced the Greeks at Salamis only there is no scholarly consensus on even an approximate effigy. There would as well accept been many smaller ships such as penteconters (50 oars) and triaconters (30 oars) only Herodotus' figure of 3000 seems wildly exaggerated.
The Greek Fleet
Greek tactics & strategy were decided past a quango of 17 commanders from each of the contributing contingents.
The allied Greek fleet was commanded by the Spartan Eurybiades, a surprising choice considering information technology was Athens who was the not bad naval power and supplied by far the about ships. The two other senior commanders were Themistocles of Athens and Adeimantus of Corinth. In effect, tactics and strategy were decided past a quango of 17 commanders from each of the contributing contingents. Yet, it is Themistocles, the brilliant naval commander, cartoon on his 20-year experience and flush from the success of Artemision against far superior numbers, who is widely credited with deciding to concord position at Salamis instead of retreating to the isthmus of Corinth and masterminding the Greek victory.
Herodotus' figures are in one case once more inconsistent, his grand total of 380 triremes making up the Greek fleet is 15 more than than the sum of his individual state contributions:
- Athens 200
- Corinth 40
- Aegina 30
- Megara 20
- Sparta 16
- Sicyon xv
- Epidaurus 10
- Eretria seven
- Ambracia 7
- Troezen five
- Naxos 4
- Hermione 3
- Leucas 3
- Styra 2
- Ceos 2
- Cythnos ane
The figures for some states are suspiciously similar to those given before the Battle of Artemision, implausibly suggesting either they suffered next to no losses in that conflict or a swift replacement of vessels. Aeschylus states a total figure of 310 and Thucydides 400. In summary, we tin but say that the Persian armada seems to have significantly outnumbered the Greek.
The Trireme
Both sides had very similar ships - the triremes (triērēis) - which were forty-l ton wooden warships up to 40 grand long. Lite, streamlined, and manoeuvrable, they were powered in boxing by 170 oarsmen split in iii ranks down each side of the send. Able to rapidly accelerate, brake, zigzag, and turn 360 degrees in just two ships' lengths, adept seamanship could identify the vessel to best advantage and use the primary strategy of naval warfare at that fourth dimension which was to ram the enemy, making full use of the bronze ram fitted to the prow of the vessel. Triremes likewise carried a small complement of soldiers, at least 10 hoplites and four archers. The Persians generally carried more - xiv combatants and thirty Medes armed with bow, spear, and sword. These extra troops came into their own when at close quarters with the enemy and in the case of boarding an enemy vessel.
![Greek Trireme [Illustration]](https://www.worldhistory.org/img/r/p/500x600/154.jpg?v=1626534003)
Greek Trireme [Analogy]
Triremes had a weakness in that they could only operate effectively in relatively calm seas with waves less than ane grand high; otherwise, h2o would enter via the oar-ports and flood the ship. Also, they had to stay close to shore as each nighttime they needed to be beached if the light wood was non to become h2o-logged, significantly reducing the speed performance of the vessel. In addition, there was very little space on board for provisions and no room to sleep so the crews had no selection but to land each night. Prior to the boxing the Greek ships were beached at several trophy on the island of Salamis from Cynosoura to Paloukia. Here too were much of the evacuated populace of Athens and Attica. The Persians, meanwhile, were stationed at the Phaleron Bay, less than ten km away across the Saronic Gulf and close to the captured Piraeus.
Strategies
Commanders led from the front & each would have been on his ain ship at the heart of the battle.
Commanders led from the front and each would have been on his own transport at the eye of the battle. From there, manoeuvres could be signalled to other ships in the armada using flags and trumpets. However, once the battle got fully underway, naval conflicts became a case of a single ship against a unmarried opponent rather than precisely coordinated manoeuvres.
Prior to full appointment betwixt the opposing fleets, there were two principal strategies employed by the more able commanders. The kickoff was sailing effectually the enemy line (periplous) and the 2d was smashing through gaps in the enemy line and attacking from their rear flank (diekplous). Both were designed to get i's ship in a position to ram the weakest point of the enemy - the side or stern quarter. The objective was to puncture a hole in the enemy vessel or break a sufficient number of their oars to disable the transport. To avoid damaging one's own oars, crews were drilled to withdraw them in a matter of seconds (unremarkably on only one side of the ship whilst the other side maintained the momentum of the vessel). As a defence against these ii tactics, an able commander would ensure one of his flanks was airtight off by shallows or coastline and ensure his crews were sufficiently drilled to maintain close social club. In open h2o, the ships could exist organised in a defensive circumvolve or an arc (more than practical with larger fleets) with prows pointing outwards (kyklos).
The Battle
The actual details of the battle are sketchy and often contradictory between ancient sources. Nevertheless, presenting the most commonly agreed upon elements, the first action of the battle was the revolt of ii Ionian ships to the allied Greek fleet. Themistocles, peradventure sending messages to the pro-Farsi Greek state fleets, had hoped for more such defections but no others occurred. One such ship from Tenos informed the Greeks that the Persians were amassing in the straits, blocking in the Greek armada. The Persians had moved into position overnight, hoping to surprise the enemy, but this strategy was unlikely to exist successful considering the curt distances involved and the noise made by the rowers. There is also the possibility that Themistocles had sent letters to Xerxes intimating the fragile Greek alliance was breaking upward and the fleet was nigh to retreat.
Trireme Hull with Statuary Ram
Probably, the two fleets aligned along an oblique e-west axis with the Persians close to the mainland shore with both fleets having a friendly shore backside them. Indeed, proximity to the opposite mainland shore would have been avoided by the Greek ships due to Xerxes' positioning of a contingent of his archers in that location. On the western (right) fly the Phoenicians faced the Athenians and the Ionians confronting the Spartans. On the left flank of the Persians were the Carians and Dorians. Backside the principal Greek line, the Aegina contingent and some of the Athenian ships waited in reserve. The Corinthians were stationed to the west of the battle lines protecting the passage to Eleusis whilst the pro-Persian Cyprians, Cilicians, and Hellespontines held back to the south, guarding the exit to Piraeus. According to Diodorus Siculus, Xerxes sent his Egyptian armada to seal off the straits between Salamis and Megara and appoint any Greek ships breaking off from the main fleet.
Overlooking from his command post in the early morning, Xerxes would have seen non a fleet about to retreat but the Greeks positioned two-ships deep along a 3 km long curve, perhaps presenting a line of 130 ships against the Persian main front of 150 ships, 3 ships deep. The Persians advanced, condign more closely packed as they aligned themselves with the enemy's narrower forepart. The Greeks held position, drawing the Persians into an ever-tighter confine. Ships began to ram each other, and in the tight infinite, they would take struggled to disengage. Then the armed soldiers on board would accept come up into their ain with hoplites and archers fighting on the decks much as in a state battle. With more than Farsi ships pressing in from the rear and the Corinthians joining from the side, at that place must take been a chaos of broken ships and drowning men - particularly amidst the Persians who had no shore to retreat to and most probably could not swim.
With more than space to manoeuvre, the Greek ships were able to pick off the closely packed Persian vessels which could non retreat because their lines were now several ships deep. By the afternoon, Greek victory was assured and the remaining Farsi ships retreated to Asia Modest. The final phase of the battle was the transferral of the Greek hoplite force on Salamis over to the mainland which then fabricated curt work of the Persian land forces.
Once again the cryptic oracle of Apollo at Delphi had been proved right: 'only a wooden wall volition go on you lot rubber'. Every bit at Artemision, the wooden ships of the combined Greek fleet had, for a second fourth dimension, rebuffed the Farsi advance.
Boxing of Salamis, 480 BCE
The Aftermath
Post-obit the defeat, Xerxes returned habitation to his palace at Susa and left the gifted full general Mardonius in charge of the invasion. The Persian position was still strong despite the defeat - they still controlled much of Greece and their large land regular army was intact. Later a series of political negotiations, it became clear that the Persians would not gain victory on country through diplomacy and the two opposing armies met at the Boxing of Plataea in August 479 BCE. The Greeks, fielding the largest hoplite army always seen, won the battle and finally ended Xerxes' ambitions in Greece.
This article has been reviewed for accuracy, reliability and adherence to academic standards prior to publication.
Source: https://www.worldhistory.org/Battle_of_Salamis/
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